This is not your father's recession ... or is it? by Charles S. Gascon
By Charles S. Gascon
R
ecessions are a common occurrence 
in any economy, part of the pattern of 
expansion and contraction known as the 
business cycle.  For most Americans, the cur-
rent recession is, by far, the worst recession 
in their adult lifetime.  Not since 1981 has the 
economy contracted for more than a single 
year.  Heightening economic insecurity, this 
particular recession is also associated with a 
financial crisis, as many news stories recall 
the turmoil of the Great Depression.
Although there is a strong correlation 
between financial crises and severe economic 
downturns, not all financial crises result in 
a depression or even a recession:  The U.S. 
economy never slipped into recession after 
the 1987 financial crisis.
Every recession and financial crisis has 
certain characteristics in common; at the 
same time, each event is unique.  Similari-
ties across recessions are generally related 
to declines in employment, production 
and inflation.  Financial crises tend to be 
associated with an increased demand for 
government-backed assets and a decline in 
demand for private assets—a feature known 
as “flight to quality.” 
The unique characteristics of the current 
recession are a significant decline in home 
prices and the resulting financial crisis.  
Surprising to many, the recent declines in 
employment and income, so far, have been 
consistent with past recessions.  One feature 
of the current environment that stands out 
as a stark departure from past financial 
crises—particularly compared with the 
Japanese financial crisis or with the Great 
Depression—is a proactive response by 
policymakers.
Comparing U.S. Recessions
Since 1978, economists and policymakers 
have accepted the judgment of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Busi-
ness Cycle Dating Committee on the start 
and end of a recession, or business cycle 
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organization, and the committee consists of 
well-respected economists from around the 
country.  This group defines a recession as 
“a significant decline in economic activity 
spread across the economy, lasting more 
than a few months.”  The committee does 
not use the popular definition of a reces-
sion as two consecutive quarters of negative 
growth in real gross domestic product (real 
GDP).  Because of this, dating of recessions is 
sometimes confusing.  The committee dated 
the start of the current recession as Decem-
ber 2007, even though real GDP actually 
increased by an average annual rate of 1.9 
percent during the first two quarters of 2008.
According to the committee, the U.S.  
economy has experienced six periods of  
recession during the past 40 years.
1  On 
average, these past recessions have lasted  
10.8 months.  The longest recessions— 
beginning in November 1973 and July  
1981—each lasted 16 months.  The shortest 
recession—beginning in January 1980— 
lasted six months.  Although the end of the 
current recession is unclear, some economists 
expect it to extend into mid-to-late 2009, a 
duration of about 18 to 24 months. 
In its December 2007 report, the commit-
tee focused on four indicators:  industrial 
production, total nonfarm employment, real 
personal income less transfer payments, and 
wholesale and retail sales.  Many economists 
follow these indicators to gauge the state of 
the economy.
2  Surprising to many non-
economists, the unemployment rate is not 
included.  (See Figure 1.)  The rate tends to 
reach its minimum after the recession has 
begun.  This occurs because the unemploy-
ment rate measures the share of the popula-
tion not employed but actively seeking work.  
As the economy moves into recession, many 
people stop looking for work and are omitted 
from the index.  Cushioning the unemploy-
ment rate’s decline, when the economy 
improves people will once again seek work. 
Three popular leading economic indica-
tors that tend to move prior to business cycles 
are stock price indices, housing starts and 
interest rate spreads.
3  In particular, stock 
price indices normally increase about three 
months prior to the end of a recession.
Figure 2 displays a broad collection of indi-
cators used to assess the state of the economy.  
The series were selected because they exhibit 
trends generally unique to the current 
recession.  Other important indicators have 
exhibited normal recessionary declines.  The 
figure compares the declines throughout the 
current recession (red lines) to the average 
decline over the past six recessions (solid blue 
lines).  Each series reports the percent change 
from the business cycle peak.  The horizontal 
axis reports the months before and after the 
peak.  For example, the datum on the red line 
at month one reports the percentage decline 
from December 2007 to January 2008, while 
the datum on the solid blue line at month one 
reports the average decline during the first 
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ability in each series is captured by the two 
dashed lines, which report the highest and 
lowest values recorded across the past  
six recessions.
The two charts on the top row describe the 
general state of the economy through data on 
total nonfarm employment and real personal 
income less transfer payments.  Percent-
age decreases in these series, thus far, have 
Business cycle indicators can be classified as leading, 
lagging or coincident based on their turning points 
relative to the business cycle.  For example, the S&P 
500 is a leading indicator because it generally turns 
down before the onset of a recession and up before the 
recession ends.  (There are always exceptions.)  While 
the unemployment rate is a lagging indicator, total 
employment is a coincident indicator—its peaks and 
troughs generally occur in the same month as business 
cycle peaks and troughs.  The gray bars represent the 
current and past six recessions.
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Total Nonfarm Employment
been within the range exhibited by past 
recessions.  In December 2008 (month 12 
on the chart), employment was 2.2 percent 
lower than a year ago, while real incomes 
declined by less than 1 percent.  Although 
simple charts alone cannot suggest reasons 
for these declines, low inflation has likely 
assisted in stabilizing real incomes, and 
active monetary and fiscal policies have 
mitigated the spillover effects from turmoil 
in financial markets into these broad mea-
sures of economic well-being.
In the second row are two series that 
describe the current financial crisis: home 
prices, measured by the median sales price 
of existing family homes, and stock prices, 
measured by the S&P 500 index.  The 
decrease in home prices started months 
before the current recession, dropping 
12 percent in the six months before the 
recession and another 15 percent in the 12 
months after the recession began.  During 
past recessions, home prices tended to be 
relatively stable.  Only during the 1990-1991 
recession did home prices decline by more 
than 3 percent.  Falling home prices erased 
over $3 trillion in home equity from the 
wealth of American households in 2008.  
The problems in the housing market have 
also taken a significant toll on equity prices, 
particularly the equities of financial institu-
tions highly exposed to real-estate-related 
securities.  Over the first 13 months of the 
recession, the S&P 500 lost over 40 percent 
of its value.
Trends in real consumption are reported 
in the third row of the figure.  Consump-
tion is separated into two components: 
consumption of durable goods and con-
sumption of nondurable goods and services.  
Consumption of durable goods can be 
thought of as a type of household spend-
ing on “big ticket” items (e.g., refrigerators 
and automobiles), which are more likely 
dependent on financing.  Consumption of 
nondurable goods and services tends to be 
smaller purchases that households buy with 
cash.  The figure indicates that these two 
types of consumption have different cyclical 
properties.  On the one hand, consumption 
of durables declined during past recessions; 
on the other hand, consumption of nondu-
rables and services remained stable or even 
grew during past recessions.  It is likely,                                                  
                                         continued on Page 11
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SOURCES: Employment and the Consumer Price Index are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; real income and real consumption are from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis; S&P 500 is from The Wall Street Journal; federal funds rate is from the Federal Reserve Board H.15.
The current recession is different, but how 
different?  The charts to the left put things into 
perspective.  The red lines represent the percent 
change in each series from the start of the current 
recession, December 2007.  As a benchmark, the 
blue lines report the average (solid line), highest 
(gold dotted lines) and lowest levels (purple dot-
ted lines) experienced over the past six recessions.   
(They do not represent data for a particular reces-
sion.)  If the red line remains close to the average, 
or at least above the lowest, the decline can be 
interpreted as a normal recessionary one.  The 
numbers on the horizontal axes represent months 
before and after the business cycle peak.
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he Great Depression (1929-1939) began 
about August 1929 with a severe reces-
sion, which lasted for 43 months.  Between 
1933 and 1937, the economy expanded, actu-
ally reaching its 1929 level of output.  In May 
1937, the economy again slipped into reces-
sion, although one that was much less severe 
and that lasted only through June 1938.  Most 
historians agree that the Great Depression 
ended sometime in 1939, although the worst 
year of the Depression was probably 1933.
One popular phrase in recent months has 
been “the worst decline since the Great  
Depression.”  Fortunately, the difference 
between the “worst since” and “as worse as” 
the Great Depression is vast.  Some events are 
similar:  The failure of major investment banks 
and the largest commercial bank, as well as 
a sharp decline in consumer spending, have 
been the main points of comparison between 
these episodes.  Contrary to the Depression-
era references, institutions designed to pre-
vent banking collapses and substantial action 
by policymakers make these two episodes 
very different.
The current recession would have to last  
another 2.5 years before reaching the length 
of the 1929-33 recession.  Investment banks 
have failed during the current crisis, but 
depositors’ confidence in their banks has 
remained firm.  Between 1930 and 1933, an 
average of 9.2 percent of all banks failed every 
year.  The FDIC reported last year that only 30 
of over 7,000 banks failed or received assis-
tance.  This is less than 0.5 percent.10 
The accompanying table compares recent 
declines in income, employment and stock 
prices with those experienced during the 
1929-33 recession.  The column on the left 
reports the percentage declines during the 
first year of the current recession, the center 
column shows the percentage declines over 
the first year of the Great Depression and the 
column on the right shows the total declines 
over the entire 1929-33 recession.11
The S&P 500 lost more value in the first  
12 months of the current recession than in the 
first 12 months of the Great Depression.  But 
broader economic indicators have been much 
stronger of late.  Per capita income declined 
by over 10 percent during the first year of the 
Depression, while current per capita incomes 
(before adjusting for inflation) have remained 
stable.  Similarly, employment declined by  
5.6 percent during the first year of the Great  
Depression, but declined by 2.2 percent in  
the first year of the current recession.
While it cannot be directly inferred from the 
chart, differences in government policy likely  
exacerbated the Depression-era’s declines in  
income and employment while mitigating the 
current declines.  During the Depression, the 
Revenue Act of 1932 raised taxes to meet 
budget shortfalls, and the Federal Reserve 
failed to sufficiently expand the money supply 
to offset the effect of the elevated demand 
for currency.  In contrast, in 2008, the Federal 
Reserve greatly increased the money supply, 
and the federal government implemented 
increased spending and tax reductions.
A final point of interesting information:  In 
the year after the 1929-33 recession, the 
stock market rallied, increasing 72 percent in 
one year.  However, it took another 20 years 
until the S&P 500 reached its 1929 levels.  In 
more recent times, stock prices fell 40 percent 
between 1999 and 2002, and only five years 
were needed to recover the losses.
Are Great Depression Fears Warranted?
RECESSIoN vS. dEPRESSIoN
Percentage declines between dates
Dec. 2007  
to Dec. 2008 1929 to 1930 1929 to 1933
Per capita personal income
less transfer payments –0.7 –11.7 –48.0
Total nonfarm employment –2.2 –5.6 –15.8
S&P 500 stock price index* –40.8 –30.9 –79.3
SOURCES: Author’s calculations using data from: Historical Statistics of the United States, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
and The Wall Street Journal.  * Changes are from August 1929 to August 1930 and August 1929 to March 1933.
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because real incomes have remained stable, 
that recent declines in wealth and/or liquid- 
ity constraints have suppressed both forms 
of consumption.  Consumption of durables 
declined 11 percent in the first 12 months of 
the recession.  Consumption of nondurables 
and services, while remaining relatively 
stable, declined about 1 percent over the same 
time period.
Losses in wealth associated with home 
and stock prices have reduced consumer 
spending.  Economic theory suggests that 
consumption is primarily driven by lifetime 
wealth.  In response to short-term declines 
in income, households will smooth their 
consumption by borrowing.  That means 
that consumption spending will fluctuate less 
over business cycles than household income 
or wealth will fluctuate.  This theoretical 
result must be amended to account for 
liquidity constraints, that is, some house-
holds will find it difficult to borrow money 
as their income falls because lenders will 
be uncertain of future earnings and, hence, 
prospects for repayment.  The current 
financial crisis has reportedly increased the 
difficulty of individuals and businesses to 
borrow.  The result has been the largest reces-
sionary decline in real consumption in the 
past 40 years.
The bottom row reports the trend in 
inflation, measured by the Consumer Price 
Index, and the trend in the effective federal 
funds rate.  Slowing inflation has allowed the 
Federal Reserve to act in a proactive fashion 
when dealing with the current recession.   
Not only have reductions in the federal funds 
rate been larger than in past recessions, but 
the reductions actually started three months 
before the onset of the latest recession.  The 
federal funds target decreased from 5.25 per-
cent on Sept. 17, 2007, to 2 percent on April 
30, 2008.  By the spring of 2008, when the 
financial crisis was fairly certain, the Federal 
Reserve began to aggressively reduce its tar-
get, ultimately to between 0 and 0.25 percent 
on Dec. 16, 2008.
Comparing Financial Crises
Tightening of credit, declines in asset 
prices, and banking runs or failures tend to 
characterize financial crises.
4  Tightening 
of credit occurs because banks, institutions 
and individuals fear that borrowers will be 
unable to repay a loan or investment.  The 
inability of investors to evaluate the credit-
worthiness of borrowers causes  
them to move away from private assets  
(i.e., stocks or corporate bonds) and toward 
government-issued (or guaranteed) debt 
(i.e., Treasuries, bank deposits or currency).  
The shift from private to government-issued 
debt may reduce the demand for private 
assets, such as houses or equities, which,  
in turn, pushes down their prices.
Prior to the creation of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp. (FDIC), bank runs were a 
feature of crises.  Depositors who were wor-
ried about their ability to access cash that was 
held at their bank would run to the bank to 
withdraw their money.  As depositors with-
drew funds, banks would be forced to quickly 
liquidate assets, possibly at a loss, resulting at 
times in the failure of the bank.
In the current recession, bank runs at 
FDIC-insured institutions have not occurred.  
Worried investors, however, did withdraw 
large amounts from money market mutual 
funds after a major fund “broke the buck” in 
September 2008.
5  In response, the Treasury 
and Federal Reserve instituted federal guar-
antees for all money market fund shares held 
as of Sept. 18, 2008.  Similarly, some hedge 
funds have been forced to halt redemptions 
due to attempted runs.
Many have studied the Japanese financial 
crisis for lessons on how to handle the cur-
rent U.S. financial crisis.  The Japanese crisis, 
which lasted through the 1990s, is similar 
in many ways.
6  In the decade preceding 
the crisis, deregulation allowed banks to 
transform their balance sheets, exposing 
them to more risk.  Over this same period, 
the percentage of loans that banks extended 
to real estate doubled.  During the financial 
crisis and subsequent recession, home prices 
in Japan declined over 35 percent and equity 
prices declined by roughly 60 percent.  For 
many, the U.S. declines in home and equity 
prices are all too similar.  (See Figure 2.)  
The Japanese crisis was unique, on the other 
The Japanese crisis, which lasted through the 1990s, 
is similar in many ways.  In the decade preceding the 
crisis, deregulation allowed banks to transform their 
balance sheets, exposing them to more risk. 
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a decade), but with only modest declines in 
output (close to 1 percent) and low unem-
ployment (under 5 percent). 
Many economists have been quite critical 
of how Japanese policymakers handled the 
crisis.  Economist Benjamin Friedman sug-
gested in 2000 that the Japanese government 
incorrectly pursued a policy of forbearance, 
wherein weak supervision standards allowed 
banks to postpone the correct classification 
of nonperforming assets.  Friedman also 
suggested that Japan should have applied 
more-expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies.  In response to the crisis, the Bank 
of Japan did, in fact, lower its key interest 
rate to virtually zero percent.  Many have 
suggested, however, that the Bank of Japan 
could have gone further and was mistaken 
to assume that zero interest rates ended its 
ability to stimulate the economy through 
monetary policy.
7  U.S. policymakers have 
learned from this experience and pursued 
expansionary policy even with target inter-
est rates close to zero percent.
In a recent study, economists Carmen 
Rienhart and Kenneth Rogoff compare the 
recent declines in major economic indica-
tors with the declines experienced during 
15 previous financial crises associated with 
recessions in the U.S. and elsewhere.
8  Three 
common features of the data are: (1) a col-
lapse in asset prices, (2) profound declines in 
output and employment and (3) exploding 
government debt.
As expected, collapses in asset prices tend 
to be severe during financial crises.  Rein-
hart and Rogoff report that, on average, real 
equity prices declined by 55.9 percent, while 
home prices declined by an average of 35.5 
percent.  The duration of these declines was 
particularly long:  Equity declines lasted, 
on average, 3.4 years, and home prices 
slid for six years.  While the durations are 
unknown, the declines reported in Figure 2 
are generally consistent with these averages.
The reported declines in output and 
employment are smaller than decreases in 
asset prices.  The average decline in real 
GDP per capita lasted just under two years, 
exhibiting a total decline of 9.3 percent, or an 
average quarterly decline of about 1 percent.  
In 2008, the average quarterly decline in 
real GDP per capita was 0.75 percent.  At its 
highest, the unemployment rate across these 
countries averaged 7 percent, which is only 
about 1 percentage point above the 40-year 
average U.S. unemployment rate.  A useful 
comparison is the Great Depression, during 
which the real GDP per capita declined by 
almost 30 percent and the unemployment 
rate increased to 23 percent.  (See sidebar  
on Great Depression comparison.)
Exploding government debt is possi-
bly the most astounding characteristic of 
financial crises.  In the major post-WWII 
crises that Reinhart and Rogoff studied, the 
average increase in real government debt 
was 86 percent.  The outlook for the U.S. 
national debt was ominous even before the 
current financial crisis, increasing roughly 
60 percent between 2000 and 2007.
9  Nev-
ertheless, the debt had increased another 
8.5 percent between January and September 
2008.  Reinhardt and Rogoff note that while 
antirecessionary government spending surely 
increases the national debt, the primary 
factor tends to be declining tax revenue from 
a slowing economy.  This finding is possibly 
at odds with some criticism that govern-
ment stimulus programs may raise the debt 
burden.  Absent of its effect, government 
spending will increase the debt burden, but 
successful government stimulus programs 
could actually reduce the debt by growing the 
economy and, thus, increasing tax revenue.
Look Beyond the Headlines
Much of the fear surrounding the current 
recession has stemmed from the collapse 
in home prices and subsequent turmoil in 
financial markets.  The “historic” undertone 
in the reporting of most economic data has 
heightened economic insecurity.  As unique 
as the current recession may be, the policy 
response has been very proactive.  So far, this 
has mitigated the impact of the financial cri-
sis on broader measures of economic health.  
By understanding the parallels among 
recessions, it is possible to disentangle the 
typical recession-period bad news from the 
truly unexpected bad news that might signal 
unusual problems. 
Charles S. Gascon is a research associate at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
e n dno t e s
 
1  According to the NBER, the past six reces-
sions began in December 1969 (lasting 11 
months), November 1973 (16), January 1980 
(6), July 1981 (16), July 1990 (8) and March 
2001 (8).
 
2  See the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ 
“Tracking the Recession” at http://research.
stlouisfed.org/recession.
 
3  Interest rate spreads are the difference 
between a long-term interest rate (10-year 
Treasury bond) and a short-term interest rate 
(federal funds rate).  Interest rate spreads have 
been negative before every recession in the 
past 40 years.
 
4  Tightening of credit is not necessarily unique 
to financial crises; it occurs during most, if 
not all, economic downturns.
 
5  “Breaking the buck” means that the fund’s 
asset value falls below $1 per share.
 
6  Freidman provides parallels between Japan’s 
financial crisis and the U.S. savings and loan 
crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This 
section is based on Friedman’s interpretation 
of the Japanese experience and data reported 
in Reinhart and Rogoff.
 
7  Bernanke (2000) is often credited for this 
critique.
 
8  The crises are: Norway (1899), U.S. (1929), 
Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), 
Sweden (1991), Japan (1992), Hong Kong 
(1997), Indonesia (1997), South Korea (1997), 
Thailand (1997), Malaysia (1997), Philippines 
(1997), Colombia (1998) and Argentina (2001).
 
9  See Pakko for a complete discussion.
 
10 Depression-era failures are reported in Ber-
nanke (1983).  Current failures are reported 
in FDIC table BF01, total institutions in FDIC 
table CB01. 
 
11 According to the NBER, the business cycle 
peak occurred in August 1929.  Only annual 
data are available during this time period; 
1929 is used as the recession start.  The mag-
nitudes of the declines are modestly increased 
when using the 1930 to 1931 percent change.
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